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Abstract
We wish to model common-sense reasoning in situations where it contains some of the ingredi-
ents typical of proto-scientific reasoning, with a view to future elaboration and proof of concept. To
model this proto-scientific narrative, we employ the integrative formal computational machinery we
have been developing and implementing for rational cooperative epistemic agents. In our logic-based
framework, agents can update their own and each other’s theories, which are comprised of knowl-
edge, active rules, integrity constraints, queries, abducibles, and preferences; they can engage in
abductive reasoning involving updatable preferences; set each other queries; react to circumstances;
plan and carry out actions; and revise their theories and preferences by means of concurrent updates
on self and others.
 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Common-sense reasoning; Epistemic agents; Non-monotonic reasoning; Abductive reasoning; Logic
programming
1. Introduction
“The scientific method is nothing more than a refinement of our everyday thinking.”
Albert Einstein [14, p. 9].
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In this paper we take up the perspective quoted above, enjoining to it the computer mod-
elling of common-sense reasoning. Indeed, recent developments in the logical modelling
of the rational functionalities of agents, and the intertwined combination of these function-
alities, enable us to formally model and implement, for the first time and in an integrated
fashion, common-sense reasoning and common-sense acting of agents when solving every-
day practical problems. To which we add the distributed problem solving cooperation of
similar agents [21].
Our goal has been to provide a trail blazing inroad into the use of computational logic
formalizations and logic programming techniques to address non-trivial common-sensical
behaviour, as a means to provide a valid proof of concept. In the longer term, the problems
jointly addressed by agents should become more and more scientific-like, in fulfillment of
Einstein’s dictum above, and involve the automation of the processes of discovery, argu-
mentation, etc., i.e., all that it takes to build and consolidate scientific knowledge, towards
an AI epistemology not separate but symbiotic with human epistemology [29].
The paper’s structure is as follows. First, the computational logic background and
framework is recapitulated, involving a knowledge representation language, combined ab-
ductive preferential and update reasoning, and an agent’s reasoning and activity cycle.
Second, reactive planning is introduced, and combined with the previous functionalities.
At last, the stage is set for the modelling, with the presented tools, of an elaborate example
of a proto-scientific collaborative agent common-sensical behaviour. This is enacted on the
basis of formalizing a doctor, patient, and third party, situated and developing interaction,
as described by an ongoing natural language narrative. An appreciative conclusion brings
the paper to a close.
2. Framework
2.1. Language
It is convenient to syntactically represent the theories of agents as propositional Horn
theories. In particular, we represent default negation not A as a standard propositional
variable. Propositional variables whose names do not begin with “not” and do not contain
the symbols “ :”, “÷” and “<” are called domain atoms. For each domain atom A we
assume a complementary propositional variable of the form not A. Domain atoms and
negated domain atoms are called domain literals.
Communication is a form of interaction among agents. The aim of an agent β when
communicating a message C to an agent α, is to make α update its current theory with C
(i.e., to make α accept some desired for mental state by β). In turn, when α receives the
message C from β , it is up to α whether or not to incorporate C. This form of communi-
cation is formalized through the notion of projects and updates. Prepositional variables of
the form α:C (where C is defined below) are called projects. α:C denotes the intention (of
some agent β) of proposing the updating of the theory of agent α with C. Projects can be
negated. A negated project of the form not α:C denotes the intention of the agent of not
proposing the updating of the theory of agent α with C. Projects and negated projects are
generically called project literals.
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Propositional variables of the form β ÷ C are called updates. β ÷ C denotes an update
with C in the current theory (of some agent α), that has been proposed by β . Updates can
be negated. A negated update of the form not β ÷C in the theory of some agent α indicates
that agent β does not have the intention to update the theory of agent α with C. Updates
and negated updates are called update literals.
Preference information is used along with incomplete knowledge. In such a setting, due
to the incompleteness of the knowledge, several models of a program may be possible.
Preference reasoning is enacted by choosing among those possible models, through the
expression of priorities amongst the rules of the program. Preference information is for-
malized through the notion of priority atoms. Propositional variables of the form nr < nu
are called priority atoms.1 nr < nu means that rule r (whose name is nr ) is preferred to
rule u (whose name is nu). Priority atoms can be negated, not nr < nu means that rule
r is not preferred to rule u. Priority atoms and negated priority atoms are called priority
literals.
Domain atoms, projects, updates and priority atoms are generically called atoms. Do-
main literals, project literals, update literals and priority literals are generically called
literals.
Definition 1. A generalized rule is a rule of the form L0 ← L1, . . . ,Ln with n 0 where
every Li (0 i  n) is a literal.
Definition 2. A domain rule is a generalized rule L0 ← L1, . . . ,Ln whose head L0 is a
domain literal distinct from false and not false, and every literal Li (1 i  n) is a domain
literal or an update literal.
Definition 3. An integrity constraint is a generalized rule whose head is the literal false or
not false.
Integrity constraints are rules that enforce some condition on states, and they take the
form of denials. To make integrity constraints updatable, we allow the domain literal not
false to occur in the head of an integrity constraint. For example, updating the theory of an
agent α with not false ← relaxConstraints has the effect to turn off the integrity constraints
of α if relaxConstraints holds. Note that the body of an integrity constraint can contain any
literal.
The following definition introduces rules that are executed bottom-up. To emphasize
this aspect we employ a different notation for them.
Definition 4. An active rule is a generalized rule whose head Z is a project literal and
every literal Li (1  i  n) in its body is a domain literal or an update literal. We write
active rules as L1, . . . ,Ln ⇒ Z.
Active rules can modify the current state, to produce a new state, when triggered. If the
body L1, . . . ,Ln of the active rule is satisfied, then the project Z can be selected and exe-
1 In the remaining of the paper, we implicitly assume that the relation induced by < is a strict partial order.
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cuted. The head of an active rule is a project, either internal or external. An internal project
operates on the state of the agent itself (self-update), e.g., if an agent gets an observation,
then it updates its knowledge. External projects instead are performed on other agents, e.g.,
when an agent wants to update the theory of another agent.
To express preference information in logic programs we introduce the notion of a prior-
ity rule.
Definition 5. A priority rule is a generalized rule L0 ← L1, . . . ,Ln whose head L0 is a
priority literal and every Li (1 i  n) is a domain literal, an update literal, or a priority
literal.
Priority rules are also subject to updating.
Definition 6. A query takes the form ?−L1, . . . ,Ln with n 0, where every Li (1 i  n)
is a domain literal, an update literal, or priority literal.
We assume that for every project α:C, C is either a domain rule, an integrity constraint,
an active rule, a priority rule or a query. Thus, a project can take one of the forms:
α:(L0 ← L1, . . . ,Ln) α:(L1, . . . ,Ln ⇒ Z)
α:( false ← L1, . . . ,Ln) α:(?−L1, . . . ,Ln)
α:(not false ← L1, . . . ,Ln)
Let A be a set of domain literals distinct from false, we call the members ofA abducibles.
Abducibles can be thought of as hypotheses that can be used to extend the current theory of
the agent in order to provide an “explanation” for given queries. Explanations are required
to meet all the integrity constraints.
The reader can refer to [11,12] for the declarative and procedural semantics of our
framework of abductive logic-based agents, to [9] for a logic-based agent architecture,
to [2] for a proof procedure of updating plus preferring reasoning, and to [10] for an asyn-
chronous multi-agent system in which the interaction among agents is characterized by a
transition rule system. In these references, the reader can find theorems, properties, and
examples of our framework.
N.B.: In the sequel, rules with variables stand for the set of all their ground instances
with respect to the Herbrand universe of the program.
2.2. Abductive agents
The knowledge of an agent can dynamically evolve when the agent receives new knowl-
edge, albeit by self-updating rules, or when it abduces new hypotheses to explain observa-
tions. The new knowledge is represented in the form of an updating program, and the new
hypotheses in the form of a finite set of abducibles.
Definition 7. An updating program U is a finite set of updates.
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An updating program contains the updates that will be performed on the current knowl-
edge state of the agent. To characterize the evolution of the knowledge of an agent we
need to introduce the notion of a sequence of updating programs. In the remaining, let
S = {1, . . . , s, . . .} be a set of natural numbers. We call the elements i ∈ S ∪ {0} states.
A sequence of updating programs U = {Us | s ∈ S} is a set of updating programs Us su-
perscripted by the states s ∈ S.
Definition 8. An agent α at state s, written as Ψ sα , is a pair (A,U), where A is the set of
abducibles and U is a sequence of updating programs {U1, . . . ,Us}. If s = 0, then U = {}.
An agent α at state 0 is defined by a set of abducibles A and an empty sequence of
updating programs, that is Ψ 0α = (A, {}). At state 1, α is defined by (A, {U1}), where U1
is the updating program containing all the updates that α has received at state 0 either
from other agents or as self-updates. In general, an agent α at state s is defined by Ψ sα =
(A, {U1, . . . ,US}), where each Ui is the updating program containing the updates that α
has received at state i − 1.
2.3. Abductive stable models
In the remainder of the paper, by (2-valued) interpretation M we mean any consistent2
set of literals. Given a generalized rule r of the form L0 ← L1, . . . ,Ln, we write head(r)
to indicate L0 and body(r) to indicate L1, . . . ,Ln.
Definition 9. Let P be a set of generalized rules and M an interpretation. The set of default
assumptions is:
Default(P,M) = {not A | r ∈ P such that head(r) = A and M |= body(r)}.
The knowledge of an agent α is characterized at the start (at state 0) by the set of all
default assumptions not A (that is, by Default({},M)), for every atom A. Its knowledge can
dynamically evolve when α receives new knowledge, via a sequence of updating programs
U = {U1, . . . ,Us}. Intuitively, the evolution of knowledge may be viewed as the result of,
starting with the set of all default assumptions, updating it with U1, updating next with U2,
and so on. The role of updating is to ensure that the rules contained in a new updating
program override the rules contained in a less recent updating programs, provided that
their heads contradict one another. If this is not the case, then that older rules are still valid
by inertia. This rationale is at the basis of the notion of rejected rules, spelled out below.
A rule r proposed via an update in Ui by an agent β is rejected at state s by an inter-
pretation M if there exists a rule r ′ proposed via a subsequent update in Uj by an agent α,
such that the head of r ′ is the complement of the head of r , the body of r ′ is true in M and
β does not distrust the update proposed by α. In contrast, if β does distrust α, then the rule
r ′ proposed by α cannot be used to reject older rules of β .
2 A set M is consistent iff there exists no atom X such that X ∈ M and not X ∈ M .
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Definition 10. Let U = {Ui | i ∈ S} be a sequence of updating programs and M an inter-
pretation. The set of rejected rules at state s is:
Reject(U, s,M) = {r | ∃(β ÷ r) ∈ Ui and ∃(α ÷ r ′) ∈ Uj such that i < j  s,
head(r) = not head(r ′),M |= body(r ′) and
M  distrust(α ÷ r ′)}.
The idea behind the updating process is that newer rules reject older ones in such a way
that contradictions can never arise between them. Thus, contradictions could only ever
arise between rules introduced at the same state. Furthermore, an agent can prevent any
type of updates from an agent α via the use of the atom distrust(α ÷ r ′). For instance, if
the theory of an agent α contains the rule distrust(β ÷ r) ← liar(β), and α believes that
agent β is a liar, then α distrusts the updates proposed by β .
As the head of an active rule is a project (and not a domain atom), active rules can only
be rejected by active rules. Rejecting an active rule r makes r not triggerable even if its
body is true in the model. Thus, by rejecting active rules, we make the agent less reactive.
Let Ψ sα = (A,U) be an agent α at state s and La ⊆ A a set of abducibles. We write
U +La to indicate the sequence of updating programs U ∪{Us+1}, where Us+1 = {α÷L |
for everyL ∈ La}. That is, U + La = {U1, . . . ,Us,Us+1}.
Definition 11. Let Ψ sα = (A,U) be an agent α at state s and M an interpretation. Let
La ⊆A be a set of abducibles and U ′ = U + La a sequence of updating programs. M is an
abductive stable model of agent α at state s with hypotheses La iff:
– false /∈ M
– M = least(X ∪ Default(T ,M) ∪⋃1is Ui), where:
T =
{
r | ∃(β ÷ r) in
⋃
1is+1
Ui such that M  distrust(β ÷ r)
}
,
R = Reject(U ′, s + 1,M), X = T − R.
In the definition above, T is a set containing all the rules r proposed by β via an update
β ÷ r that is not distrusted by α. R is the set of all rejected rules at state s +1. Note that the
abducibles are treated as a virtual update. That is, to compute the abductive stable models
the abducibles abduced by α at state s are treated as if they were internal updates of α at
state s + 1. The virtual update is only used to compute the abductive stable models, and
there is no commitment to what α will receive as update at the next state s + 1. Finally,
note that M contains all the updates (both trusted and not) that α has received.
2.4. Preferred abductive stable models
While updates allow us to deal with a dynamically evolving world, where rules change
in time, preferences allow us to choose among various possible models of the world and
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among possible incompatible reactions. In [3], two criteria are established to remove un-
preferred generalized rules in a program: removing unsupported generalized rules, and
removing less preferred generalized rules defeated by the head of some more preferred
one. Unsupported generalized rules are rules whose head is true in the model and whose
body is defeated by the model. Below we write body+(r) (resp. body−(r)) to indicate the
atoms (resp. the negated atoms) in the body of a rule r .
Definition 12. Let P be a set of generalized rules and M an interpretation. The set of
unsupported generalized rules of P and M is:
Unsup(P,M) = {r ∈ P | M |= head(r),M |= body+(r) and M  body−(r)}.
Unpref (P,M) is a set of unpreferred generalized rules of P and M iff:
Unpref (P,M) = least(Unsup(P,M) ∪X ),
where
X = {r ∈ P | ∃u ∈ (P − Unpref (P,M)) such that:
M |= nu < nr,M |= body+(u) and
[
not head(u) ∈ body−(r) or
(not head(r) ∈ body−(u),M |= body(r))]}.
In other words, a generalized rule is unpreferred if it is unsupported or defeated by
a more preferred generalized rule (which is not itself unpreferred), or if it attacks (i.e.,
attempts to defeat) a more preferred generalized rule. The following definition introduces
the notion of a preferred abductive stable model of an agent α at a state s with a set of
hypotheses La. Given a sequence of updating programs U and the hypotheses La assumed
at state s by α, a preferred abductive stable model of α at state s with hypotheses La is
a stable model of the program X that extends P to contain all the updates in U , all the
hypotheses in La, and all those rules whose updates are not distrusted but that are neither
rejected nor unpreferred. The preferred abductive stable model contains also the selected
projects.
Definition 13. Let Ψ sα = (A,U) be an agent α at state s and M an abductive stable model
of α at state s with hypotheses La. Let U ′ = U + La be a sequence of updating programs.
M is a preferred abductive stable model of agent α at state s with hypotheses La iff:
– ∀r1, r2: if (nr1 < nr2) ∈ M , then (nr2 < nr1) /∈ M ,
– ∀r1, r2, r3: if (nr1 < nr2) ∈ M and (nr2 < nr3) ∈ M , then (nr1 < nr3) ∈ M ,
– M = least(X ∪ Default(T ,M) ∪⋃1is Ui), where:
T =
{
r | ∃(β ÷ r) in
⋃
1is+1
Ui such that M  distrust(β ÷ r)
}
,
R = Reject(U ′, s + 1,M),
X = (T − R) − Unpref (T − R,M).
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Cycle(α, s,Ψ s−1α ,G), where Ψ s−1α = (A,U) and U = {U1, . . . ,Us−1}.
1. Observe and record any input in the updating program Us .
2. Select a query g in G∪ Queries(α,Us) and execute g. Let La ⊆A be an
abductive explanation of g, if g is provable; otherwise, let La = {}.
Let G′ = G∪ Queries(α,Us) − {g}.
3. Execute all the projects in ExecProj(La).
4. Cycle with (α, s + 1,Ψ sα,G′), where Ψ sα = (A,U ∪ {Us}).
Fig. 1. The agent cycle.
T is the set containing all the rules in updates that are trusted from α according to M ,
and R is the set of all the rules that are rejected at state s. X is the set of all the trusted
rules that are neither rejected nor unpreferred.
Definition 14. An abductive explanation for a query Q is any set La ⊆ A of hypothe-
ses such that there exists a preferred abductive stable model M with hypotheses La and
M |= Q.
Note that at state s an agent a may have several abductive explanations for a query Q.
2.5. Agent cycle
Every agent α can be thought of as a pair Ψα = (A,U), where A is a set of abducibles
and U is a sequence of updating programs. The abducibles are used as abductive expla-
nations for queries. The basic “engine” of an agent α is an abductive logic programming
proof procedure executed via the cycle represented in Fig. 1. Below let G be a set of queries
that α has to prove.
Step 1: The cycle of an agent α starts at state s by observing any inputs (updates from
other agents) from the environment, and by recording them in the updating program Us .
Step 2: α selects and executes a query g is selected from G ∪ Queries(α,Us), where
Queries(α,Us) = {?−g | α ÷ (?−g) ∈ Us}.
Note that only the queries issued by the agent a itself are executed. The queries issued by
other agents are treated as normal updates.3 Here, to execute g one can use any abductive
proof procedure, such as ABDUAL [4,5].
Step 3: α executes all the executable projects. The set ExecProj of executable projects of
an agent depends on the kind of agent we want to model. For instance, in case of a cautious
agent, the set of executable projects is:
ExecProj(La) = {β:C | for every preferred abductive stable model Mat state s
with hypotheses La, it holds that β:C ∈ M}.
3 In this way, α retains control upon deciding on which queries (requested by other agents) to execute. For
example, the theory of α may contain the active rule: β ÷ (?−g), Cond ⇒ α:(?−g) which states that if α has
been requested to prove a query ?−g by β and some condition Cond holds, then α will issue the internal project
to prove the query ?−g.
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If an executable project takes the form β:C (meaning that agent α intends to update the
theory of agent β with C at state s), then (once executed) the update α÷C will be available
as input to the cycle of the agent β .
Step 4: Finally, α cycles by increasing its state, by incorporating the updating program
Us into U , and with the new set G′ of queries.
Initially, the cycle of α is Cycle(α,1,Ψ 0α , {}) with Ψ 0α = (A, {}).
2.6. Temporary updates
Until now we have considered permanent updates: whenever an agent α updates its
theory, the update persists by inertia until it is contradicted by a counter-update. Often, for
example in applications based on planning, it is desirable to update the theory of an agent
with updates that hold for a limited period of time. Consider that case where we want to
make the update of the theory of an agent valid only for the next state. We employ projects
of the form α : once(. . .) to achieve that. Consider the active rule:
cond ⇒ α : once(C)
in the theory of an agent α. It states that if the condition cond holds at the current state
in the theory of α, then α must update its theory with C with the restriction that C holds
only at the next state in what this update is concerned. This ability can be coded in our
framework as follows. We can first formalize a counter that allows an agent to count its
states.
counter(s(0))
counter(X) ⇒ α : not counter(X)
counter(X) ⇒ α : counter(s(X))
Initially, the counter is set to 1. At every cycle of α, the two active rules above are
triggered. By executing the corresponding projects, at the next cycle of α the value of the
counter is increased by one unit.
Suppose that C can be a generalized rule or an active rule. Then, active rules of the
form:
cond ⇒ α : once(a)
cond ⇒ α : once(a ← a1, . . . , an)
cond ⇒ α : once(a1, . . . , an ⇒ z)
can be expressed in our framework as:
cond, counter(X) ⇒ α : (a ← counter(s(X)))
cond, counter(X) ⇒ α : (a ← a1, . . . , an, counter(s(X)))
cond, counter(X) ⇒ α : (counter(s(X)), a1, . . . , an ⇒ z)
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3. Reactive planningIn classical planning an agent typically performs the following steps: (i) it makes ob-
servations about the initial situation of the world, (ii) it constructs a plan that achieves the
desired goal, and finally (iii) it executes the plan. During the planning process (step (ii)),
the world must be frozen. In fact, if some condition relevant to the plan changes its value, it
is possible that some precondition crucial to the plan is not satisfied any longer. The same
applies to step (iii). This assumption is not realistic in real-world applications where for
instance the world is inaccessible, non-deterministic and open (i.e., the agent may have
incomplete information), exogenous events are possible (e.g., actions by other agents or
natural events), and the world may not match the agent’s model of it (i.e., the agent may
have incorrect information). To overcome the restrictions of classical planning, research in
planning (see, e.g., [7,15,17,19,28]) is focusing more and more on reactive planning sys-
tems, i.e., systems able to plan and to control the execution of plans. In reactive planning,
planning itself is not necessarily a priori reasoning about the preconditions and the effects
of actions. Rather, planning (deliberation) and execution (action) are interleaved, plans can
be modified, abandoned, and substituted with alternative plans dynamically at run-time.
During the execution of this kind of plans, the agent can therefore interleave deliberation
and action to perform run-time decision making.
This approach to planning may involve also the ability to generate revisable plans, that
is, plans that are generated in stages. After having executed the actions of each stage, we
test whether the performed actions have been successful in order to move to the next stage.
If some action failed, then we must revise our plan. A successful plan is a revisable plan
that has been completely executed such that the obtained final state satisfies the original
goal.
3.1. Plans
We introduce here the notion of a plan as a sequence of actions. In the following, given
a set N of action names, we represent an action whose name is a ∈N and its preconditions
and effects are precA and effectA with an active rule of the form:
a,precA ⇒ α : effectA
We write a1 · · · ak to indicate the sequence a1, . . . , ak of the action names.
Definition 15. LetN be a set of action names. Then, a plan is any sequence a1 · · · ak
(k  0) of action names in N .
Intuitively, a plan ab c states to execute first a, then b, and finally c. This capability
allows an agent to execute actions in sequence. For instance, if the actions a, b, and c are
defined by three distinct active rules ra , rb , and rc , then the sequence ab c permits
executing the projects occurring in the heads of ra , rb , and rc sequentially.
Consider an agent α that has a plan consisting of two actions, a followed by b. Suppose
that the plan is executable if some condition cond holds. Such a planning problem can be
expressed as:
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p ← cond, ab
a,precA ⇒ α : effectA
b,precB ⇒ α : effectB
The execution of the plan ab is launched by means of the query ?−p if the conditions
cond of the plan are fulfilled. When the execution of the plan ab starts, the action a
is executed first, provided that precA holds. The effects of executing a are expressed via
the project α : effectA. If instead precA does not hold, then the plan p cannot be accom-
plished and it is therefore abandoned. Once the execution of a is terminated, the action b
is executed.
This planning problem can be coded in our framework as follows:
(1) p ← cond, start
(2) exec(a), precA ⇒ α : effectA
(3) exec(b),precB ⇒ α : effectB
(4) start ⇒ α : once(exec(a))
(5) exec(a),precA ⇒ α : once(exec(ta))
(6) exec(ta) ⇒ α : once(exec(b))
(7) exec(b),precB ⇒ α : once(exec(tb))
with the set of abduciblesA= {start}. Suppose that cone is true. Then the query ?−p, by
means of the rule (1), has the effect of abducing start which in turn will trigger the active
rule (4). When the agent α executes the project α : once(exec(a)), at the next agent cycle it
will update its theory with once(exec(a)) indicating that it must execute the action a of the
plan. This update will hold only at the next state of α (temporary update). (For the coding
of once(. . .) see Section 2.6.)
The active rules (2) and (3) characterize the actions a and b by stating to update the
theory of α with the effect of the action provided that action must be executed and its
preconditions hold. Finally, the active rules (5)–(7) model the sequencing of the actions
a and b. If the action a must be executed and its preconditions hold, then the active rule
(5) is triggered. Doing so has the effect of making α (at the next cycle) to temporarily
update its theory with once(exec(ta)) indicating that the execution of α is terminated. In
turn, exec(ta) will trigger the active rule (6) which temporarily updates the theory of α
with once(exec(b)). This means that at the next cycle α must execute the action b. This
proceeds until α has terminated the execution of b (i.e., once(exec(tb)), the execution of
the entire plan is then terminated.
3.2. Executing plans
Plans that can be executed in parallel and plans containing actions that can start a sub-
planning process can also be expressed. The parallel execution of two plans p1 and p2 can
be expressed as:
p ← p1,p2
p1 ← cond1, a1 · · · an
396 P. Dell’Acqua, L.M. Pereira / Journal of Applied Logic 2 (2004) 385–407
p2 ← cond2, b1 · · · bm
Executing the plan p gives rise to the parallel execution of the subplans p1 and p2. One
can also formalize a plan p containing an action a1 whose effect is to start the execution
of a subplan q .
p ← cond1, a1a2a3
q ← cond2, b1b2
a2 ⇒ α : ?−q
In a similar way, one can formalize reactive plans, that is, plans whose planning phase and
execution phase are interleaved.
p ← cond1, a1a2a3
a3 ⇒ α : ?−planner(. . .)
Executing the last action of the plan a1a2a3 starts a deliberation phase: a planner is
invoked to generate the next actions to be performed.
Often in reactive planning it is needed to interleave the planning phase with an abductive
phase. During the abductive phase, the agent can make abductions to be employed later in
its decision making. Let A= {b} a set of abducibles. Consider the planning problem:
p ← cond1, a1a2a3
a2 ⇒ α : ?−b
When α executes the action a2, it will issue the project α : ?−b, and the query ?−b will be
executed at the next cycle of α. Since b ∈A, b will be abduced.
3.3. Conditional plans with sensing actions
In the presence of incomplete information, the notion of a plan as a “fixed” sequence
of actions is no longer adequate. In response to this, a notion of conditional plan, that
combines sensing actions and conditional constructs such as if-then-else, has been pro-
posed [27,28]. In this context, a sensing action is an action that determines the value of
some proposition. For example, “looking at the door” is a sensing action that determines
whether or not the door is closed.
In this section we illustrate how to express conditional plans in our framework. We
consider conditional plans formalized as follows, where we assume that every action in N
is either a sensing action or a non-sensing action.
Definition 16. Let N be a set of action names.
1. A sequence a1 · · · ak (k  0) of non-sensing action names in N is a conditional
plan.
2. If a1 · · · ak (k  0) is a sequence of non-sensing action names in N , ak+1
is a sensing action that determines f , and b and c are conditional plans, then
a1 · · · akak+1 if (f, b, c) is a conditional plan.
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3. Nothing else is a conditional plan.To execute a plan a1 · · · akak+1 if (f, b, c), an agent α first executes a1 · · · 
akak+1. Then it evaluates f : if f is true, it executes b else c.
Consider the following planning problem:
p ← cond, a1a2 if (f, b1b2b3, c1),
where a2 is a sensing action determining f , and b1b2b3 and c1 are conditional plans.
Suppose that every action x in the conditional plan (including sensing actions) is expressed
as:
x,precX ⇒ α : effectX
The conditional plan above can be first translated into the (ordinary) plan:
p ← cond, a1a2 if (f,p1,p2)
p1 ← b1b2b3
p2 ← c1
if (f,p1,p2), f ⇒ α : ?−p1
if (f,p1,p2),not f ⇒ α : ?−p2
and then coded into our framework as shown in Section 3.1. Note that the sensing action
a2 and the if-then-else construct if (f,p1,p2) are treated here as ordinary actions.
3.4. Executing, suspending and resuming plans
In reactive planning the ability to modify, abandon, and substitute plans with alternative
plans at run time is fundamental. In this section we illustrate how plans can be suspended,
resumed and stopped. Consider the following planning program:
p ← cond, ab
a,precA ⇒ α : effectA
b,precB ⇒ α : effectB
cond1 ⇒ α : ?−stop(p)
cond2 ⇒ α : ?−suspend(p)
cond3 ⇒ α : ?−resume(p)
where the last three active rules state the conditions to stop, suspend, and resume the plan.
This planning problem can be coded in our framework as follows:
(1) p ← cond,not block, start
(2) block ← cond1
(3) block ← cond2
(4) not block, exec(a),precA ⇒ α : effectA
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(5) not block, exec(b),precB ⇒ α : effectB
(6) start ⇒ α : once(exec(a))
(7) not block, exec(a),precA ⇒ α : once(exec(ta))
(8) not block, exec(ta) ⇒ α : once(exec(b))
(9) not block, exec(b),precB ⇒ α : once(exec(tb))
(10) cond2, exec(X) ⇒ α : suspended(X)
(11) cond3, suspended(X) ⇒ α : once(exec(X))
(12) cond3, suspended(X) ⇒ α : no suspended(X)
whereA= {start}. The query ?−p has the effect to start the execution of the plan provided
that the preconditions cond of p hold and that the plan is not blocked, i.e., both cond1 and
cond2 do not hold. This is achieved by abducing start, that in turn triggers the active
rule (6).
Rules (4) and (5) characterize the actions a and b. Those rules are not trigger-able in
the case the plan is blocked. The active rules (7)–(9) model the sequential execution of the
plan. Being not block one of their preconditions, as soon as one of the conditions cond1 or
cond2 become true, none of these 3 active rules is triggerable, and the plan is consequently
stopped or suspended.
Rule (10) characterizes the suspension of the plan. If cond2 is true, then block holds and
the agent α updates its theory with the action suspended (i.e., with suspended(X)). This is
needed to allow α to resume its plan. If the condition cond3 becomes true, then the plan
is resumed by triggering the last two active rules (11) and (12). α updates its theory with
once(exec(X)) (rule (11)) indicating that the suspended action X must be executed and
with not suspended(X) (rule (12)) X being no longer suspended.
4. Modelling proto-scientific reasoning by rational agents
Next we illustrate how to model, with the above instruments, common-sense reasoning
in situations where it contains some of the ingredients typical of proto-scientific reason-
ing, with a view to future elaboration, proof of concept, and extension of the approach to
scientific reasoning itself. To do so, we construe an exemplificative narrative of a doc-
tor/patient cooperative diagnostic situation development, involving a combination of a
number of common rational abilities illustrative of proto-scientific reasoning and acting,
which demand their joint exercise, both in an individual and a cooperative fashion, akin to
scientific theory refinement. To model this proto-scientific narrative, we employ the inte-
grative formal computational machinery we have been developing and implementing for
rational cooperative epistemic agents, and recapitulated above. Indeed, in our logic-based
framework, agents can update their own and each other’s theories, which are comprised
of knowledge, active rules, integrity constraints, queries, abducibles, and preferences; they
can engage in abductive reasoning involving updatable preferences; set each other queries;
react to circumstances; plan and carry out actions; and revise their theories and preferences
by means of concurrent updates on self and others.
The narrative below involves an initial patient situation requiring causal explanation;
plus his interactive recourse to a doctor, whose initial therapeutic theory, diagnoses, and
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diagnostic preferences, are conducive to his advising the patient; and furthermore, initia-
tive is required by the patient about courses of action to obtain prescribed medicine, and
experimentation and observation of its effect; but meanwhile, unforeseen circumstances
provide unexpected new information and action from a third agent, become pertinent for
the problem at hand; as a result, the doctor’s original theory is revised, in what regards his
diagnostic preferences, in the light of the patient’s experimentation, and the unexpected
triggering of an unforeseen action by the third party. The example has been fully tested
with our implementation.
4.1. Requiring causal explanation
John runs a small software house and likes working until late when needed. He drinks
coffee and has been a heavy smoker for a long time. Recently, he’s having problems with
sleeping. He would like to have a break from his work, perhaps a vacation, but he does not
have any company. Thus, he keeps on working. John does not know what the cause is and
decides to visit a doctor. He tells the doctor about his sleeping problems and asks him what
is the cause. John answers all of the doctor’s questions.
To abbreviate the presentation of the example, we assume that every agent is equipped
with an initial theory. This theory can be understood as an initial updating program whose
updates are performed by the agent itself. Thus, when we write that the theory of an agent
α contains a rule r , we intend that we have the update α÷ r in one of the updating program
of α. Recall that we write generalized rules containing variables as a shorthand for all their
ground instances.
John
work
likeWork
sProblems
badHabits
longTimeBadHabits
explanation ← cause(P,X, sProblems)
sProblems, company ⇒ john : take Vacation
sProblems,not company,not explanation ⇒ doctor : sProblems
sProblems,not company,not explanation ⇒ doctor : ?−askReason(sProblems)
doctor ÷ (?−Q),Q ⇒ doctor :Q
doctor ÷ (?−Q),not Q ⇒ doctor : not Q
Since the theory of John does not contain any priority rules, the preferred stable model
of John at the current state is equivalent to his abductive stable model M1 whose posi-
tive part consists of M+1 = {work, likeWork, sProblems,badHabits, longTimeBadHabits,
doctor : sProblems,doctor : ?−askReason(sProblems)}. According to the definition of
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agent cycle, John will execute the two projects in M+ (step 3 of the agent cycle), and1
then he will cycle (step 4).
When the doctor shall observe his inputs (step 1), he will receive the two updates:
john ÷ sProblems
john ÷ (?−askReason(sProblems))
Any time the doctor is asked a reason for a medical problem by a patient, the doctor
must make a diagnosis. To do so, he must first collect the relevant information about the
medical problem from the patient, then diagnose the cause of the problem and tell it to the
patient together with the suggested treatment.
doctor
A= {cause(. . .), treatment(. . .)}
N = {collectRelInfo(. . .),findCause(. . .),findTreatment(. . .),answer(. . .)}
diagnosis(P,X,Y ) ← collectRelInfo(P,Y )
findCause(P,X,Y )answer(P, cause(P,X,Y ))
findTreatment(X,T )answer(P, treatment(X,T ))
relevant(work, sProblems)
relevant(likeWork, sProblems)
relevant(badHabits, sProblems)
relevant(longTimeBadHabits, sProblems)
P ÷ (?−askReason(Y )) ⇒ doctor : ?−diagnosis(P,X,Y )
collectRelInfo(P,Y ), relevant(R,Y ) ⇒ P : ?−R
answer(P,A) ⇒ P :A
findCause(P,X,Y ) ⇒ doctor : ?−cause(P,X,Y )
findTreatment(X,T ) ⇒ doctor : ?−treatment(X,T )
Since the doctor does not have any goal to execute at step 2, he starts executing his
projects (step 3). At this step, the unique project in his preferred abductive stable model
is doctor : ?−diagnosis(john,X, sProblems). Thus, at the next cycle of the doctor, the
plan to make a diagnosis will start (step 2) by collecting all the information relevant
for the sleeping problems. This will make the doctor ask John the following questions
john : ?−work, john : ?−likeWork, john : ?−badHabits and john : ?−longTimeBadHabits.
After the replies of John (recall that John answers every question of the doctor), the
theory of the doctor will be updated with:
john ÷ work
john ÷ likeWork
john ÷ badHabits
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john ÷ longTimeBadHabits
After having executed the first action of the diagnosis plan, the doctor must find out
a cause and the corresponding treatment of the problem, and tell them to John. To find a
cause, the doctor employs abduction. This is achieved by means of the active rule
findCause(P,X,Y ) ⇒ doctor : ?−cause(P,X,Y )
The doctor has three hypotheses that may explain John’s sleeping problems: bad habits
(like drinking coffee and smoking), stress, or insomnia. The doctor evaluates John with
the help of his medical history, and he diagnoses a chronic insomnia. The doctor discards
bad habits since John has been drinking coffee and smoking for many years without the
attending sleeping problems. The doctor prefers to diagnose chronic insomnia attributable
to stress since John’s stress may be positive stress due to the fact that John likes his work.
doctor
cause(P, insomnia, sProblems) < cause(P, stress, sProblems) ← pStress(P )
cause(P, stress, sProblems) < cause(P, insomnia, sProblems) ← stress(P ),
not pStress(P )
pStress(P ) ← stress(P ),P ÷ likeWork
stress(P ) ← P ÷ work
false ← cause(P,badHabits, sProblems),P ÷ longTimeBadHabits
Being pStress(john) true in the theory of the doctor, the doctor prefers the abductive
explanation cause(john, insomnia, sProblems) to the abductive explanation cause(john,
stress, sProblems). Since it does not satisfy the integrity constraints, the abductive expla-
nation cause(john,badHabits, sProblems) is excluded by the doctor.
As treatment for insomnia, the doctor can either prescribe sleeping pills or suggest John
have a rest. Sleeping pills being preferable to a vacation on the assumption that John can
continue to work by having the pills, the doctor prescribes them.
doctor
treatment(P, insomnia, sPills) < treatment(P, insomnia, rest) ← cWork(sPills),
P ÷ workcWork(sPills)
According to the diagnosis plan, the doctor will tell John about the cause and the treat-
ment for his sleeping problems. This is achieved by executing the actions answer(john,
cause(john, insomnia, sProblems)) and answer(john, treatment(john, insomnia, sPills))
which make the doctor execute the projects john : cause(john, insomnia, sProblems) and
john : treatment(john, insomnia, sPills). Once the two projects are executed, John updates
his theory at the next cycle with:
doctor ÷ cause(john, insomnia, sProblems)
doctor ÷ treatment(john, insomnia, sPills)
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4.2. Agent initiative to obtain prescribed medicinesJohn tries to get sleeping pills before going to bed. Since it is late, he thinks the phar-
macy nearby is closed, and plans to go to another pharmacy, downtown.
John
A= {}
N = {goToPharmacy,askPills(. . .),buyPills,havePills(. . .),askAnotherPharmacy,
go(. . .), enterPharmacy(. . .)
}
takePills ← doctor ÷ treatment(john, insomnia, sPills)
getPills ← goToPharmacy
askPills(pharmacist)
if (havePills(pharmacist),buyPills,askAnotherPharmacy)
choosePharmacy(f 1) ← open(f 1),not choosePharmacy(f 2) (r1)
choosePharmacy(f 2) ← open(f 2),not choosePharmacy(f 1) (r2)
r1 < r2 ← near(f 1)
near(f 1)
open(f 2)
goTo(f 1) ← choosePharmacy(f 1),go(nearSquare) enterPharmacy(f 1)
goTo(f 2) ← choosePharmacy(f 2),go(square)go(center)
 enterPharmacy(f 2)
takePills,not havePills ⇒ john : ?−getPills
goToPharmacy ⇒ john : ?−goTo(X)
buyPills ⇒ john : havePills
go(X) ⇒ john : at(X)
enterPharmacy(F ) ⇒ john : in(F )
Since John must take the sleeping pills and he does not have them, by triggering the first
active rule above, he will issue the internal project john : ?−getPills. This has the effect of
launching the plan to get to a pharmacy and buy the pills. This plan is a conditional plan.
In fact, askPills(pharmacist) is a sensing action determining whether or not the pharmacist
has the sleeping pills. The subsequent action if (. . .) states that if the pharmacist has the
pills, John will buy them, otherwise he will ask the pharmacist for the address of another
pharmacy.
The theory of John contains a priority rule stating to prefer r1 to r2 if the pharmacy f1
is nearer. As f1 is not open, it cannot be chosen (i.e., the body of r1 is false). In fact, the
rule r2 does not belong to the set of unpreferred rules (see Def. 12) since body+(r1) is not
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true. choosePharmacy(f 1) being false and open(f 2) true, John chooses f2. To get to f2
John must get to the square, to the center, and finally enter f2.
While he is going there, he notices lights on in the nearby pharmacy and he concludes
that it is open. So he decides to interrupt his original plan and go to this nearby one. It
being open, he buys the pills.
environment ÷ lightOn(f 1)
lightOn(f 1) ⇒ john : open(f 1)
open(f 1) ⇒ john : ?−stop(getPills)
open(f 1) ⇒ john : ?−getPills
Since John believes that f1 is open, he will trigger the last 2 active rules above. Thus,
John will stop the execution of the plan and he will relaunch his goal to get to a pharmacy.
Now, since f1 is open, the rule r1 is preferable to the rule r2. Therefore John will go to the
nearby pharmacy.
The ability to stop the execution of a plan and replanning characterize the reactive be-
haviour of John. Here we have coded those abilities directly into the theory of John. In
general, we can express the relevant conditions under which a plan must be stopped and
invoke a planner to revise the plan accordingly.
4.3. Patient’s experimentation
John takes the sleeping pills. But his work implies coffee and stress, and the attempt
fails. One day he meets his friend Pamela and tells her about his problems.
john ÷ sProblems
john ÷ takingPills
john ÷ stillsProblems
Pamela advises him to suspend the taking of sleeping pills, not to work so hard, and to
have some rest. She invites him for an exciting vacation to one of the Caribbean islands.
Pamela
friend(john)
P ÷ sProblems ⇒ P : rest
P ÷ takingPills,P ÷ stillsProblems ⇒ P : not takePills
friend(P ) ⇒ P : invite(vacation, carabbean)
John decides to follow her piece of advice and accepts her invitation.
John
pamela ÷ invite(vacation, carabbean)
A ÷ invite(X,Y ), female(A) ⇒ A : accept(X,Y )
female(pamela)
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4.4. Doctor’s original theory revisedSubsequently John can sleep. One day he meets the doctor and tells him what happened.
john ÷ takingPills
john ÷ stillsProblems
john ÷ vacation
john ÷ not sProblemsAfterVacation
The doctor now revises his theory of preferences to suggest a vacation in the first place
in the future.
doctor
P ÷ takingPills,P ÷ stillsProblems ⇒
doctor : not(treatment(Q, insomnia, sPills) < treatment(Q, insomnia, rest))
P ÷ vacation,P ÷ not sProblemsAfterVacation ⇒
doctor : treatment(Q, insomnia, rest) < treatment(Q, insomnia, sPills)
The doctor updates his priority rules via the two active rules above in such a way as to
suggest a different treatment to other patients with insomnia problems.
5. Related work
The use of computational logic for modelling multi-agent systems has been widely
investigated (e.g., see [1,23] for a roadmap). One approach close to our own is the
agent-based architecture proposed by Kowalski and Sadri [16], which aims at reconcil-
ing rationality and reactivity. Agents are logic programs that continuously perform the
observe-think-act cycle. The thinking or deliberative component consists in explaining the
observations, generating actions in response to observations, and planning to achieve its
goals. The reacting component is defined via a proof-procedure which exploits integrity
constraints.
Another approach close to ours is the Dali multi-agent system proposed by Costan-
tini [8]. Dali is a language and environment for developing logic agents and multi-agent
systems. Dali agents are rational agents that are capable of reactive and proactive behav-
iour. These abilities rely on and are implemented over the notion of event.
The Impact system [6] represents the beliefs of an agent by a logic-based program and
integrity constraints. Agents are equipped with an action base describing the actions they
can perform. Rules in the program generalize condition-action rules by including deontic
modalities to indicate, for instance, that actions are permitted or forbidden. Integrity con-
straints, as in our approach, specify situations that cannot arise and actions that cannot be
performed concurrently. Alternative actions can be executed in reaction to messages.
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The BDI approach [22] is a logic-based formalism to represent agents. In it, an agent
is characterized by its beliefs, desires (i.e., objectives it aims at), and intentions (i.e., plans
it commits to). Beliefs, desires, and intentions are represented via modal operators with a
possible world semantics.
Another logic-based formalism proposed for representing agents is Agent0 [24]. In
this approach, an agent is characterized by its beliefs and commitments. Commitments are
production rules that can refer to non-consecutive states of the world in which the agent
operates. Both the BDI and the Agent0 approach use logic as a tool for representing agents,
but rely upon a non-logic-based execution model. This causes a wide gap between theory
and practice in these approaches [23].
An example of a BDI architecture is Interrap [20]. It is a hybrid architecture consist-
ing of two vertical layers: one containing layers of knowledge bases, the other containing
various control components that interact with the knowledge bases at their level. The low-
est control component is the world interface that manages the interactions between the
agent and its environment. Above the world interface there is the behaviour-based com-
ponent, whose task it is to model the basic reactive capabilities of the agent. Above this
component there is a local planning component able to generate single-agent plans in re-
sponse to requests from the behaviour-based component. On top of the control layer there
is a social planning component. The latter is able to satisfy the goals of several agents by
generating their joint plans. A formal foundation of the Interrap architecture is presented
in [13].
Sloman et al. [25,26] proposed a hybrid agent whose architecture consists of three
layers: the reactive, the deliberative, and the meta-management layer. The layers oper-
ate concurrently and influence each other. The deliberative layer, for example, can be
automatically invoked to reschedule tasks that the reactive layer cannot cope with. The
meta-management (reflective) layer provides the agent with capabilities of self-monitoring,
self-evaluation, and self-control.
A hybrid architecture, named Minerva, that includes, among others, deliberative and
reactive behaviour was proposed by Leite et al. [18]. This architecture consists of sev-
eral components sharing a common knowledge base and performing various tasks, like
deliberation, reactiveness, planning, etc. All the architectural components share a common
representation mechanism to capture knowledge and state transitions.
6. Conclusion
We believe to have shown that the application of proto-scientific reasoning in common-
sense examples, modelled by collections of rational agents, is an avenue of research worth
pursuing with a view to further the modelling of collaborative scientific theory develop-
ment and refinement. Three worthwhile aspects we did not touch upon, but which are
already well within reach of present formal machinery are rule induction, argumentation,
and mutual debugging.
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